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Abstract
Societies socialize children about sex. This is done in the presence of peer-group e¤ects, which
may encourage undesirable behavior. Parents want the best for their children. Still, they
weigh the marginal gains from socializing their children against its costs. Churches and states
may stigmatize sex, both because of a concern about the welfare of their ocks and the need to
control the cost of charity associated with out-of-wedlock births. Modern contraceptives have
profoundly a¤ected the calculus for instilling sexual mores. As contraception has improved
there is less need for parents, churches and states to inculcate sexual mores. Technology
a¤ects culture.
Keywords: Add Health, children, church and state, contraception, culture, parents, peer-
group e¤ects, premarital sex, out-of-wedlock births, shame, socialization, stigmatization,
technological progress
1. Introduction
Shame is a disease of the last age; this seemeth to be cured of it. Marquis of
Halifax (1633-1695)
The last one hundred years have witnessed a revolution in sexual behavior. In 1900, only
6% of U.S. women would have engaged in premarital sex by age 19see Figure 1 (all data
sources are discussed in Appendix 12.1). Now, 75% have experienced this. Public acceptance
of this practice reacted with delay. Only 15% of women in 1968 had a permissive attitude
toward premarital sex. At the time, though, about 40% of 19 year-old females had experienced
it. The number with a permissive attitude had jumped to 45% by 1983, a time when 73%
of 19 year olds were sexually experienced. Thus, societal attitudes lagged practice.1 Beyond
the evolution and acceptance of sexual behavior over time, there are relevant cross-sectional
di¤erences across females. In the U.S., the odds of a girl having premarital sex decline with
family income. So, for instance, in the bottom decile 70% of girls between the ages of 15 and
19 have experienced it, versus 47% in the top one. Similarly, 68% of adolescent girls whose
family income lies in the upper quartile would feel very upsetif they got pregnant, versus
46% of those whose family income is in the lower quartile. The goal here is to present a model
that can account for the rise in premarital sex, the decline in shame and stigma associated
with it and the cross-sectional observations about sex and the attitudes towards it.
The idea is that young adults will act in their own best interest when deciding to engage
in premarital sex. They will weigh the benets from the joy of sex against its cost; i.e., the
possibility of having an out-of-wedlock birth. An out-of-wedlock birth has many potential
costs for a young woman: it may reduce her educational and job opportunities; it may hurt
her mating prospects on the marriage market; she may feel shame or stigma. Over time the
odds of becoming pregnant (the failure rate) from premarital sex have declined, due to the
facts that contraception has improved and more teens are using some methodFigure 2. The
cost of engaging in premarital sex fell, as a result. This leads to the paradoxical situation
where, despite the fact that the e¢ cacy of contraception has increased, so has the number of
out-of-wedlock births.
The shame or stigma that a young woman incurs from premarital sex may drop over time
too. Suppose that parents inculcate a proscription on premarital sex into their daughters
1Observe that toward the end of the sample period the level of premarital sex declines and attitudes
become more conservative. It is possible that the emergence of AIDS/HIV played a role in the decline of
premarital sex, because this activity became more riskysee Greenwood and Guner (2010). This might also
have a¤ected attitudes.
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Figure 1: Premarital Sex, attitudes and practice
moral bers. If a daughter engages in this activity she may feel a sense of guilt or impropriety
due to this inculcation. Call this shame. As Coleman (1990, p. 295) nicely puts it: the
strategy is to change the self and let the new self decide what is right and what is wrong (for
example, by imagining what ones mother would say about a particular action).Parents do
this because they want the best for their daughter. They know that an out-of-wedlock birth
will hurt their daughters welfare. As contraception improves, the need for the proscription
diminishes and with it the amount of parental indoctrination. Additionally, a girl may feel
less guilt about engaging in premarital sex when more of her friends are practicing the same
thing. Call this a peer-group e¤ect.
The same shift in incentives may also change the moral proscriptions of institutions such
as the church and state. Churches and states care about the well-being of their members.
They also must care about the cost of providing alms to unwed mothers and out-of-wedlock
children. A girl or parent who violates these proscriptions may bear a mark of disgrace or
discredit, with the church, state or community. Label this stigma, whose archaic meaning is
a scar left by a hot iron.If shame or stigma have a capital good aspect that is transmitted
over time, however, their reduction may lag the increase in sexual activities.
Di¤erences in the costs of an out-of-wedlock birth also explain the cross-sectional obser-
vations. The desire to socialize by a parent will be smaller the less socializations impact is
on a childs future well being. Therefore, there may be little incentive to socialize children
at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale because they have no where to go in life anyway.
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Figure 2: E¤ectiveness in contraception and out-of-wedlock births to teenage girls
Similarly, the payo¤ for a parent to changing his o¤springs self is higher the closer and longer
the parents connections to the child are. Hence, in societies where parents lose contact with
their o¤spring when they grow up, the incentives to socialize the latter may be attenuated.
These mechanisms will be examined here by developing an overlapping generations model
where parents invest e¤ort into the socialization of their children. The concept of socializing
children is operationalized by letting a parent inuence his o¤springs tastes about an out-of-
wedlock birth. Doing so incurs a cost in terms of e¤ort to the parent, say spent educating his
children about sexual mores. After socialization, some o¤spring will engage in sex, resulting
in a percentage of out-of-wedlock births, and others will not. In the following period, there
is a matching process in the marriage market. The presence of an out-of-wedlock child
will diminish the attractiveness of a woman as a partner. After marriages occur, the new
households will produce, consume, and raise and socialize their own kids (including any
previous out-of-wedlock children).
The developed model also includes a role for peer-group e¤ects. In particular, a young
female feels less shame from having an out-of-wedlock birth when her friends and acquain-
tances are engaging in premarital sex. Peer group e¤ects are likely to increase the equilibrium
amount of premarital sex. Therefore, they strengthen the need for shaming by parents. Just
how much is a quantitative question. This is investigated here.
A steady state for the model is calibrated to match some stylized facts for todays U.S.
economy. This is done to show that the framework can replicate some features of modern
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times and to discipline the analysis before computing the models transitional dynamics. The
stylized facts are: (i) the observed cross-sectional relationship between a girls education and
the likelihood that she will engage in premarital sex; (ii) the amount of time that a mother
spends socializing her daughter as a function of the formers educational background; (iii)
the degree of assortative mating in the U.S. conditioned upon the presence or not of an out-
of-wedlock birth; (iv) the observed relationship between peer-group e¤ects and the likelihood
that a girl will enter into a sexual relationship. After this, some transitional dynamics are
computed for the situation where society faces a known time path of technological progress
in its contraceptive technology. It is demonstrated that the model can replicate the observed
rise in premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births.
Illegitimacy is also costly for institutions such as the church and state, which have typically
provided unwed mothers with some form of charity. A Ramsey-style problem is considered
where the church-cum-state tries to inuence attitudes in order to minimize the number of
out-of-wedlock births net of the cost of socialization. That is, the church-cum-state works to
stigmatize premarital sex. Specically, a parent whose child has an out-of-wedlock birth will
feel a mark of discredit or opprobrium. This encourages parents to provide a moral education
to their children, say by taking them to church. When doing this, church-cum-state takes
into account the inuence that it has on peer-group behavior. This is something, societys
mores so to speak, that parents must take as exogenous when deciding how to socialize their
daughters. Group behavior is something, though, that social institutions may sway.
Before proceeding onto a more detailed exploration of the historical evidence, the inves-
tigation should be framed within the literature on modelling the purposeful transmission of
preferences, beliefs, and norms using economic models.2 The modern analysis of how to af-
fect a childs preferences through parental investments starts with Becker (1993), who was
undoubtedly inuenced by the work of Coleman (1990). He explored how parents may predis-
pose childrenspreferences toward providing them with old age support. Becker and Mulligan
(1997) focus on the manipulation of the childs rate of time preference. This idea is extended
in Doepke and Zilibottis (2008) work on the decline of the aristocracy that accompanied
the British Industrial Revolution. They argue that parents, who thought that their children
might enter the class of skilled workers, instilled in their o¤spring a patience that allowed
their children to sacrice today in order to acquire the human capital necessary so that they
2There is also a growing literature on evolutionary models of preferences transmission. [See Barkow et
al. (1992) for an Evolutionary Psychology perspective, and Robson and Samuelson (2010) for a survey in
Economics.] Similarly, Durham (1992) explores the coevolution of genetic traits with endogenous socialization.
While those mechanisms are clearly relevant in the long run, the time frame of the sexual changes focused on
here, around a century, excludes a large role for evolution in the observed variations of behavior.
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would earn more tomorrow.3
The current work builds on the preference transmission literature by emphasizing how
technological innovation induces changes in the socialization decisions of parents through
shifts in incentives. Parentsdecisions become an amplication mechanism of the original
technological shocks. The paper can be read, in part, as an example of this type of am-
plication mechanism. Other examples are the shifts in investments that parents make in
promoting the patience, self-discipline, religiosity, ethnic or national identication, or cultural
appreciation when the economic environment changes. Furthermore, the analysis focuses on
how endogenous socialization generates a lag between behavior and societal attitudes. In
such a way, a mechanism is built that formalizes the insights of Ogburn (1964) regarding the
existence of a lag between technology and cultural change. Greenwood and Guner (2010)
also study the impact that technological advance in contraception has had on social behavior
and interaction. They build an equilibrium matching model where youths make decisions
about which social groups (either abstinent or promiscuous ones) to circulate within. The
group they mix with will depend both on the state of contraceptive technology and on what
others are doing. They dene social change simply as shifts in the relative sizes of these social
groups, which reect the aggregation of decentralized decision making at the individual level.
The emphasis here is very di¤erent: the spotlight is on the role that parents, and institutions,
play in shaping their childrens sexual mores, and therefore their behavior, and on the lags
between this behavior and societal acceptance.
Finally, there is a large empirical literature relating culture and economic behavior that
is too wide to survey here. Guiso et al. (2006) provide a nice summary of many of the issues
studied by economists over the last few years. Of particular interest is the evidence regarding
the e¤ect of ethnic capitalas documented by Borjas (1992), Fernández and Fogli (2009),
and Guiliano (2007). The current analysis can be used to interpret this evidence as the result
of the persistence in parentsdecisions induced by the role that socialization plays as a state
variable; i.e., the action of a youth today is inuenced by the socialization she or he received
from her or his parents, which in turn is a¤ected by the socialization they experienced from
their parents.
The discussion now turns to a review of some historical evidence establishing that pre-
marital sex was not widespread in Western societies until the 20th century. This begets
two questions: How did society control premarital sex in yesteryear? And, why did sexual
3Bisin and Verdier (2001), and a number of following papers, approach the problem of preferences trans-
mission from a di¤erent perspective: parents want children to behave like them [see Bisin and Verdier (2008)
for a short summary of the existing knowledge]. Under this assumption, they analyze the evolution of the
distribution of traits in the population and how the incentives of parents regarding the level of socialization
invested in their children evolve depending on the aggregate distribution of traits.
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behavior change in such a dramatic fashion during the 20th century?
2. Historical Discussion
Every lewd woman which have any bastard which may be chargeable to the parish,
the justices of the peace shall commit such women to the house of correction, to
be punished and set on work during the term of one whole year. Statute of 7
James, cap 4 (1610).4
Widespread participation in premarital sex is a recent phenomenon in Western societies.
In yesteryear only a small fraction of women must have entertained it.5 This can be inferred
from Figure 3, which plots the number of out-of-wedlock births for England and Wales from
1580 to 2004. The experience for other Western European countries is similar. Therborn
(2004, p. 149) reports that the percentage of children born out of wedlock among live births
around 1896-1900 was 6% in Australia, 8% in Belgium, 9% in Germany, 6% in Italy, 4%
in New Zealand, 3% in the Netherlands, 2% in Ontario (Canada), 5% in Spain, and 5% in
Switzerland. Furthermore, prenuptial conception (i.e., births happening less than 9 months
after the wedding) was relatively low.6
Given the primitive state of contraception, the small number of out-of-wedlock births is
only consistent with a small fraction of the population engaging in premarital sex, especially
because some women might have had more than one such birth and because a substantial
fraction of those births came from long-lasting cohabitating couples that for some reason
or another had not formalized their marriage.7 It is interesting to note that the recent rise
in out-of-wedlock births occurred at a time when the gross reproductive rate (GRR) was
4As quoted by MacFarlane (1980, p. 73).
5The case for men might be di¤erent since prostitution was a rather common practice in Western societies
Therborn (2004).
6In some pockets of Western Europe prenuptial conception was higher during the 16th to 18th centuries.
This observation must be handled with care, however. In the traditional European marriage pattern, there
was a betrothal and a formal wedding, often with a non-trivial amount of time between the two. Betrothal was
a serious a¤air. It was a legally binding contract. It established the really important things back then: who
would get what. The courts enforced these contracts by imposing serious penalties on those who broke them.
Although the Church was adamantly opposed to it, the practice in rural Europe was often to look the other
way from the sex of the soon-to-be married couples. [Many peasants thought that they were married after
the betrothal. See for example, the description in Godbeer (2002, p. 3)]. Therefore, prenuptial conceptions
might have been post-betrothal conceptions (and there are reasons to believe this was the vast share). For the
model developed below it does not matter whether the line dening premarital sex is drawn at the betrothal
or the marriage.
7For instance, a typical reason for the large number of cohabitating couples in Paris of the 19th century
was the legal costs of civil marriage (including a notarized parental consent), which could amount to more
than one months wage for a poor working coupleFuchs (1992).
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Figure 3: The percentage of all births that are out-of-wedlock from 1580-2004 and the gross
reproductive rate 1540-2000, both for England and Wales
declining. The small number of out-of-wedlock births is also surprising in light of the fact
that for much of the period women tended to marry late (around 26 years of age in the
seventeenth century), with a signicant fraction never marryingsee Voightlander and Voth
(2009) for a discussion of the European marriage pattern. The trend in U.S. teenage out-
of-wedlock births follows a very similar patternrecall Figure 2. Why was this practice so
limited in the past?
Engaging in premarital sex was, until recently, a risky venture. First, it was illegal and
viewed as being morally reprehensible. Second, an out-of-wedlock birth placed a female in
a perilous economic state. Some historical examples of how premarital sex was stigmatized
will now be presented. In 1601, the Lancashire Quarter sessions condemned an unmarried
father and mother of a child to be publicly whipped.8 They then had to sit in the stocks still
naked from the waist upwards. A placard on their heads read These persons are punished
for fornication. In early America, a New Haven court in 1648 ned a couple for having sex
out of marriage.9 The magistrate ordered that the couple be brought forth to the place of
correction that they may be shamed.He said that premarital sex was a sin which lays them
8This case is taken from the classic book by Stone (1977, p. 637).
9The discussion on premarital sex in early America derives from Godbeer (2002).
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open to shame and punishment in this court. It is that which the Holy Ghost brands with the
name of folly, it is wherein men show their brutishness, therefore as a whip is for the horse
and asse, so a rod is for the fools back.These were not isolated cases. The prosecution of
single men or women either for fornication, or of married couples who had a child before
wedlock, accounted for 53% of all criminal cases in Essex country, Massachusetts, between
1700 and 1785. Likewise, 69% of all criminal cases in New Haven between 1710 and 1750 were
for premarital sex. In the Chesapeake Bay, when an unmarried woman gave birth to a child,
she was levied a large ne or, in case she could not pay, publicly whippedsee Fisher(1989).
The otherwise moderate and pacic Quakers found that the English Crown decided in 1700 to
suspend their Pennsylvania Law Code of 1683 against fornication because it was unreasonably
harsh, a revealing judgement since the English crown was not particularly progressive in its
views about crime and punishment.
It is also telling that in colonial America, abortion was punished when it was intended
to cover adultery or fornication; however, it was overlooked when it was used as a device to
control fertility within a marriage. In Pennsylvania, the law was taken even one step further.
If a bastard child was found dead, the mother was presumed to be guilty unless she could
prove otherwise, overriding the general English law principle of presumption of innocence.
This change in the principle of the law was particularly harsh, as the punishment for the
crime was hanging.10
The shame and stigma attached to premarital sex, and other forms of illicit sex, is reected
by the language used to describe such acts. Words such as debauched, lascivious, lewd, loose,
incontinent, vain and wanton were used to reect a lack of self control; others such as base,
deling, polluting, unclean, and vile described the desecration of the body associated with
illicit sex; yet others such as adultery, disorderly, indolation, misdirection, rebellion, uncivil,
unlawful, conjured up the notion of civil or religious disobedience and a¤ected even those
in situations of social prestige and power. So, for example, the son and namesake of the
renowned minister John Cotton was excommunicated in 1664 by the First Church of Boston
for lascivious unclean practices with three women.
There are also plenty of historical examples of the relationship between the environment
and promiscuity. The economic consequences for an unwed mother and her child could be dire.
Churches, courts and parents tried to make the father and mother of an out-of-wedlock child
marry. The next best option was to ensure that the father paid child support. Sometimes
neither of these two options worked. The outlook for the mother and child could then be bleak.
Note that the statute cited at the beginning of this section only seemed to apply to women that
10See Klepp (1994, p. 74).
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needed support. Now, nineteenth century France, an anomaly compared with other Western
European countries, provides an interesting illustration of how the environment can a¤ect
social behavior.11 The French Civil Code of 1804 prohibited questioning by the authorities
about the paternity of a child. As a consequence, males could evade the responsibility for
bringing up their illegitimate o¤spring. Roughly at the same time, all French hospitals
were instructed to receive abandoned children. These laws may have drastically changed the
cost and benet calculations of engaging in premarital sex, and encouraged illegitimacy and
abandonment on a grand scale. In 1816 about 40% of births in Paris were out of wedlock,
and 55% of these children were abandoned. In 1820 a staggering 78% of these kids would
have died. (Many of these out-of-wedlock births were undoubtedly from young women who
lived outside of Paris and who moved to the anonymity of the capital after getting pregnant.)
Why would an unwed mother abandon her child?
The decision to abandon a child was most likely dictated by the economic circumstance.
A woman was paid about half that of a man in a similar job. Her earnings barely covered
her subsistence. In the 1860s, a working woman could earn somewhere between Fr250-600
a year taking into account seasonal unemployment. It cost approximately Fr300 a year for
rent, clothing, laundry, heat, and light. Even at the maximum salary this did not leave much
for foodless than a franc a daylet alone the costs of clothing and wet nursing a baby (the
later is estimated at Fr300 a year). A working woman could certainly not a¤ord to raise a
child alone. Furthermore, there is evidence, especially for the early part of the century, that
abandonments were correlated with the price of bread.12
Illegitimacy disproportionately a¤ected the ranks of the working class. In 1883 the Reg-
istry General for Scotland tabulated that only 0.5% of illegitimate births were to the daughters
of professional men.13 The middle and upper classes had to worry about how illegitimacy
would disrupt the transfer of property through the lineage. English author Samuel Johnson
expressed this concern well: Consider of what importance to society the chastity of women
is. Upon that all the property in the world depends. We hang a thief for stealing a sheep, but
the unchastity of a woman transfers sheep, and farm, and all from the right owner.Illegiti-
macy was connected to the structure of the environment that the working class lived in. In
nineteenth century Scotland, the Lowlands had a much higher rate of illegitimacy than the
11The material on France is drawn exclusively from Fuchs (1984).
12The excellent monograph by Boswell (1988) provides a survey of child abandonment in Western Europe
from late antiquity to the Renaissance. Two important conclusions of this study are the following. First,
many abandoned children were born from married couples. Therefore, the statistics on abandonment cannot
be read as statistics on pre-marital sex. Second, abandonment was relatively common even among the elites,
because it precluded succession issues and inheritance disputes (another economic motive).
13The source for Scotland is Smout (1980).
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Highlands. This has been tied to the economy of the two places, and how it impacted on the
relationship between parents and their children. In the Lowlands labor was mobile. Young
and old laborers independently travelled from farm to farm, district to district, taking work
where available. As a consequence, young males and females freely mixed in the residences of
farms (the chaumer system). A young man could easily evade his responsibility to a pregnant
woman. His parents would su¤er little stigma, neither would they be forced to lend nancial
support. In the more stable Highlands disappearing was more di¢ cult. Additionally, in the
Lowlands it was easy for unwed mothers to nd jobs milking cows or tending to turnips. Fur-
thermore, in some places a ploughman had to provide an able-bodied female to work along
side (the bondager system). Since the work unit was often then the family some feel that
this meant that partners had to prove their fecundity before marriage.
Other areas of Western Europe with high illegitimacy ratios, like Alpine Austria or north-
ern Portugal, had land property structures that prevented a large number of men and women
from participating in a marriage market (thus eliminating a powerful incentive for avoiding
out-of-wedlock children) and experienced large outmigration.
It will be shown next that, even today, shame inuences the sexual behavior of teenagers.
This force may be mitigated by the presence of peer group e¤ects. Specically, teens may
feel less shame about engaging in premarital sexual activity when a signicant number of
their peers are sexually active. This will be investigated too. Beyond providing more sup-
portive evidence for the developed model, the next section will play a disciplining role for the
calibration undertaken in Section 8.
3. Evidence on Shame and Peer Group E¤ects in the U.S., 1994-
1996
Does shame have an impact on teenage sexual behavior in modern times, where contraception
is readily available? Data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
Health) will be used to address this question.
Add Health is a representative sample of U.S. adolescents who were in grades 7 to 12 at 134
junior and senior high schools during the 1994-1995 school year. The respondents have been
followed in four waves, although for the current purpose only the rst two (1994 and 1996,
a panel of about 15,000 students) are needed. Add Health is particularly well suited for the
study of social interactions because it contains detailed information about sexual behavior,
sexual knowledge, shame from premarital sex or pregnancy, religiosity, parental background,
school characteristics, etc. Furthermore, there are observations for many students from the
same school and respondents are asked to identify their friends from the sample. Thus, peer
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groups can be constructed from either students who attend the same school or from groups
of friends.
Peer group e¤ects may play an important role in explaining premarital sex. Teenagers
may be more likely to engage in this activity if their friends or classmates do so. Thus, the
transition from the limited amount of teenage sexual activity in the past to the wide-spread
participation today may have been inuenced by such e¤ects.
So, what factors in the data a¤ect the chances that a teenage girl will engage in premarital
sex? To investigate this, consider a logistic regression of the form shown below
Pr(y = 1jx;y i; 1) = L(+ x+ y i; 1); (1)
where the independent variable y takes the value of 1 if a teenage girl starts having sex between
Waves I and II and is 0 otherwise, x is a vector of explanatory variables (including a measure
of shame discussed below), y i; 1 is the fraction of teenage girls among the respondents peers
who have already had premarital sex in Wave I, and L is the (cumulative) logistic distribution
function. The vector x includes variables related to stigma, religion, family background, etc.,
that are reported in Add Health.
The above logistic regression and the panel structure of the data set overcome the reec-
tion problemprevalent in cross-sectional samples: group behavior a¤ects individual behavior
but the group by denition is the sum of the individuals.14 In particular, the analysis focuses
on those girls who made the transition from never having premarital sex in Wave I to having
had it in Wave II. Therefore, this subset of girls could not have inuenced those who had sex
in Wave I, which is the peer group. Thus, y i; 1 can be taken as exogenous in the regression.
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Another potential problem in identifying peer-group e¤ects is the presence of correlated ef-
fects. Peer groups may not be formed randomly. Perhaps a teenager associates with her peers
because they have similar unobserved characteristics. If you are interested in having sexual
relationships then you may choose to associate with others who share this predispositionsee
Greenwood and Guner (2010) for a model of this. In the analysis below peer groups are based
on a teenagers school, assuming that the school is exogenous to the individual and parental
14Manski (1993) and, in more detail, Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) demonstrate that the reection problem
is less severe in a discrete choice model with social interactions because identication is derived from the
nonlinear structure of the problem. Nevertheless, it is still useful to exploit the panel structure of the data
to minimize this (and other) problems in small samples.
15A similar approach is used by Clark and Loheac (2007) to study teenage consumption of alcohol, marijuana
and tobacco and by Patacchini and Zenou (2011) to investigate the transmission of religiosity between parents
and children. An alternative strategy would be to use the characteristics of nonoverlapping peers of peers for
a respondent to instrument for her own peerssee Calvo-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2009), Bramoulle,
Djebbari and Fortin (2009), and De Giorgio, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010).
11
characteristics of the respondent. Since school choice by parents might be partly endogenous,
some further controls are considered. First, in Wave I, Add Heath asks parents if they chose
a particular neighborhood for school quality. This can be controlled for in the analysis. Sec-
ond, it is possible to di¤erentiate between those teenagers who have moved to a neighborhood
recently (within a year) and those who have been living there longer. Since correlated e¤ects
are likely to be di¤erent for these two groups, one can also control for whether the respondent
is a recent resident. Teenagers within a particular school might also behave in a similar way
since they face the same institutional constraints. To control for this, further regressors can
be added to capture school characteristics.
3.1. The Shame Variable
Add Health contains several di¤erent variables both on the shame from sex and how religious
a teenager is. Since these variables are correlated, it is not desirable to use them all. Instead,
factor analysis is employed to consolidate the variables into a single one, called shame.
The basic idea is that there is a common factor, shame, which a¤ects a respondents answers.
In the factor analysis, 11 variables are used relating to: the perceived shame a teenage girl
would feel from her mother or family regarding premarital sex; the personal shame/concern
the teenager would have about sex; her shame/concern about a pregnancy; and the girls
religiosity. These eleven variables are then statistically aggregated into a common single
shame variable via factor analysis. This single factor explains about 50% of variation in these
11 variablessee the Appendix 12.2 for a brief discussion of factor analysis and a complete
list of the variables used.
3.2. Results
Table I shows the coe¢ cients from di¤erent logistic regressions.16 In all regressions the
dependent variable reports whether the respondent started having sex between Wave I and
Wave II. The table starts with a simple specication where the only explanatory variables
are shame and the fraction of teenagers who have already had sex in the respondents school
in Wave I (to capture the peer-group e¤ects). Both the peer-group and shame variables have
signicant e¤ects on teenage initiation of premarital sex (the normalization of the shame
factor implies that higher values of the variable are associated with weaker feeling of shame).
Next, controls are added for race and age. Controls are then included for observations such
as parental income in Wave I, whether or not the respondent has a romantic relation in Wave
II, her grades (an average of her math, English, science and social sciences scores, with a
16The basic results in Table I also hold with probit or linear probability regressions.
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lower number indicating a higher average), and whether the teenager believes that she looks
older than her peers.
The main lesson from Table I is that the e¤ect of peer groups and shame is very robust
across these di¤erent specications (where *, **, and *** represent statistical signicance
at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively). Teenagers are more likely to start having sex if
they have a large group of peers who have already had sex and they are less likely to have
sex if they are ashamed of it. Several other individual characteristics are considered, such
as maternal education, maternal religiosity, whether the respondent lives with two biological
parents, whether she has an older sibling, whether she received sex or AIDS education at
school, whether her parents are satised with their relationship with the girl, how much
parents talk about sex with her and whether the teenager works and has an independent
source of income.17 None of these additional factors enter the regression signicantly, or
a¤ect the magnitude and signicance of the variables of interest.
Table I: Peer Group Effects and Shame
I II III IV V VI
School Average 1.741** 1.592** 1.288* 1.662** 1.779* 1.772*
Shame 0.641*** 0.645*** 0.663*** 0.617*** 0.581*** 0.606***
Parental Income -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.007**
Romantic Relation 1.787*** 1.677*** 1.650***
Grades 0.379** 0.351**
Physical Development 0.582***
Control For Race No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Age No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 1,986 1,985 1,505 1,505 1,142 1,142
In Table II, additional controls are added to correct for correlated e¤ects. Whether parents
chose a particular neighborhood for school quality or whether the respondent moved into
the current residence less than one year ago enter these regressions signicantly.18 The
magnitudes of peer-group e¤ects and shame are not a¤ected in a material way, although
the peer-group e¤ect is now only signicant at the 10% level. Some additional controls
are also considered; viz., school type (public, private and religious), school location (urban,
suburban and rural), school size, class size, the fraction of teachers with a masters or Ph.D.
17These additional variables are the usual controls in the literaturesee, among others, Udry and Billy
(1987), Fletcher (2007), and Richards (2010).
18The idea to di¤erentiate between recent and not-so-recent movers was initially suggested by Gaviria and
Raphael (2001).
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degree, the proportion of teacher who has been working more than 5 years at the school, the
proportion of parents involved in parentsorganization at the school, and the proportion of
white students in the school. None of these variables turn out to be signicant and they do
not a¤ect the basic ndings.19
Table II: Controlling for Correlated Effects
I II
School Average 1.699* 1.715*
Shame 0.616*** 0.606***
Parental Income -0.008*** -0.008**
Romantic Relation 1.648*** 1.650***
Grades 0.356** 0.353**
Physical Development 0.600*** 0.581***
Parental Choice 0.046
Recent Movers -0.034
Control For Race Yes Yes
Control for Age Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 1,119 1,142
The existing empirical literature on teenage sexual (or other) behavior usually relies on
cross sectional data and tries to overcome the reection problem by using instrumental vari-
ables (IV). A common strategy is to dene peers as students who are in the same grade as
the individual under study and use the peerscharacteristics as instrumental variables for
their sexual behavior.20 Since the peer group is dened at the grade level, school xed ef-
fects are added to these regressions to control for correlated e¤ects.21 Some IV estimates of
peer-group e¤ects are reported in the Appendix 12.2 using Wave I of Add Health. Consistent
with the previous literature a signicant peer-group e¤ect is found when shame is ignored
as a right hand side variable. When shame is added as an explanatory variable, peer-group
e¤ects become insignicant.
19Average values of the controls variables among the respondents peers were also added to the regressions
in Table I in order to control for what the literature calls exogenous (or contextual) e¤ects. These exogenous
variable were not signicant and did not change the basic ndings.
20See, for example, Fletcher (2011) or Richards (2010) for recent applications.
21Equation (1) could be estimated with peers dened at the grade, instead of school, level. Since the
analysis focuses on the initiation of premarital sex between Wave I and Wave II, the sample size is too small
here to conduct the analysis at the grade level.
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3.3. The Import of the Results
How do peer-group e¤ects and shame a¤ect premarital sex? Given the above regressions
(Table I, column VI) one can calculate the following marginal e¤ects, expressed in terms of
semi-elasticities, displayed in Table III. A shift in the shame variable by 1% leads to a change
in the odds of having premarital sex of 0.023 percentage points. Similarly, a movement in
the school average by 1% adjusts the probability of engaging in premarital sex by 0.068
percentage points. This implies that a change of one standard deviation in the school average
would cause a shift of 2.5 percentage points in the odds of engaging in premarital sex, while
a shift of one standard deviation in the shame factor is associated with a movement of 5.3
percentage points in this probability. The size of the estimated elasticity for the peer-group
e¤ect will be used to discipline the subsequent quantitative analysis. There does not appear
to be a natural way to do the same thing with the shame variable, given its ordinal nature.
Table III: Marginal Effects
Semi Elasticity
School Average (Peer Group E¤ect) 0.068
Shame 0.023
A model will now be developed where both peer-group e¤ects and shame play a role in
a teenagers decision to engage in premarital sex. Parents and social institutions, such as
the church and state, will perform important parts in socializing teenagers about the perils
of premarital sex. They do this by shaming and stigmatizing the act. The behavior of
other teenagers will determine peer-group e¤ects. Specically, the more teenagers there are
engaging in the act the less shame there will be associated with it.
4. The Economic Environment
Imagine a world comprised of overlapping generations of females and males. Assume each
female will always give birth at the beginning of adult life to just one set of twins, a male
and a female. Thus, there is no aggregate population growth. The birth of the twins may
occur in or out of wedlock. Since males play a passive role in analysis, they are relegated into
the background for the most part. Girls are socialized by their parents. This socialization is
important when teenage daughters decide whether or not to engage in premarital sex. A high
level of socialization by ones parents will induce a high level of shame if an out-of-wedlock
birth occurs. But, why should parents socialize their daughters? Altruism is the mechanism
here. In particular, later in life, old parents realize utility from the socioeconomic status of
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the household that their adult daughter lives in.22 Daughters who experience out-of-wedlock
births are more likely to be in households of low socioeconomic status than those who do
not. Since the likelihood of this situation depends on the level of socialization given to young
daughters, young parents will invest resources in it. In the analysis socialization is a costly
activity, so parents undertake it judiciously.
Individuals live for three periods: youth, adulthood, and old age. Females are born with
two characteristics: their productivity y 2 Y  fy1;    ; yng and their libido l 2 L = [0; 1],
which represents the utility they realize from sex. The distributions over Y and L are given
by Y and L. The distribution function L is independent across generations. The distribution
over Y is conditional on the mothers type; i.e., there is some transfer of ability across
generations. In particular, Y (y0jy) is increasing in y, in the sense of stochastic dominance.
Because the birth rate for each type of female is xed, there is no need to keep track of
potential shifts in Y over time due to cross-sectional di¤erences in births rates. Denote
the stationary distribution associated with Y (y0jy) by Y . Assume that a suitable law of
large numbers holds in this economy and that, consequently, individual probabilities equal
aggregate shares of realizations of random variables.
5. Young Females
Youths live with their parents. Girls are socialized by their parents at the beginning of their
youth. Represent the level of socialization by s. This denotes some level of investment that
parents make in inuencing a daughters views on premarital sex. The word investment is used
deliberately. Noncognitive skills, such as the sense to avoid risky activities like drinking, doing
drugs, or engaging in premarital sex, are important for building a childs human capital. They
complement the formal schooling stressed by economistse.g. Restuccia and Urritia (2004).
After this socialization occurs, female youths decide whether or not to engage in premarital
sex. This is the only decision a young female makes. If they do so, they receive a utility
l  0, but risk a pregnancy with probability 1 . Think about  as representing the quality
of the contraception technology, including more drastic measures, specically abortion and
infanticide. For example, it may be reasonable to view the 1973 decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court that legalized abortion as a drop in 1  .
An out-of-wedlock birth will generate a present-value of guilt in the amount S (s). The
shame function S () is increasing and strictly concave in s. If girls do not engage in premarital
22The altruism is of an imperfect form. Parents dont take into account the joy their teenage daughters
experience from premarital sex. This is probably a better description of the world than assuming that they
do. Additiionally, altruism is only in one directions; i.e., kids do not care about their parents.
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sex, they get utility normalized to zero. The shame that a girl may su¤er from an out-of-
wedlock birth may be mitigated by peer-group e¤ects. Let e represent the aggregate number
of females in the girls generation that are engaged in premarital sexual relationships. The
peer-group e¤ect will be represented by P (e), so that the net shame a girl will su¤er from
an out-of-wedlock birth is S (s)  P (e).
A female will enter adulthood next period with a known level of productivity, y0, and
perhaps an out-of-wedlock child. Represent the value function for a female adult next period
by A0 (y0; I 0), where I 0 indicates whether or not she had an out-of-wedlock birth. In particular,
I 0 2 f0; 1g will return a value of one when an out-of-wedlock birth has occurred. Here a prime
is attached to a variable to denote its value in the next period. Likewise, a prime is attached
to a function to signify that the implied relation changes as time progresses. A precise
denition for A will be provided in Section 6. The function will have the properties that
A0 is increasing in y0 so that higher productivity girls can expect higher levels of utility vis
à vis lower productivity ones. It will also transpire that A0 (y0; 0) > A0 (y0; 1), so that an
outof-wedlock birth is costly.
5.1. Premarital Sex
Direct attention now to a female youths decision about whether or not to engage in premarital
sex. On the one hand, if a female youth is abstinent then she will realize an expected lifetime
utility level of A0 (y0; 0). On the other hand, if she engages in premarital sex, she will realize
the enjoyment l, but will become pregnant with probability 1   . Her expected lifetime
utility level will be l+A0 (y0; 0)+ (1  ) [A0 (y0; 1) S (s)+P (e)]. She will pick the option
that generates the highest level of expected lifetime utility. Her decision can be summarized
as follows:
Abstinence if A0 (y0; 0)  l + A0 (y0; 0) + (1  ) [A0 (y0; 1)  S (s) + P (e)];
Premarital sex if A0 (y0; 0) < l + A0 (y0; 0) + (1  ) [A0 (y0; 1)  S (s) + P (e)]:
(2)
Pick a row in (2) and x y0 and s. Observe that the right-hand side is increasing in l while
the left-hand side is constant. Thus, there is a threshold for utility from sex for females, l,
such that
A0 (y0; 0) = l + A0 (y0; 0) + (1  ) [A0 (y0; 1)  S (s) + P (e)];
or
l = L (s; e;y0)  (1  ) fS (s)  P (e) + A0 (y0; 0)  A0 (y0; 1)g: (3)
This expression equates the utility of sex, given by l, with its expected cost, the di¤erence
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in future expected utilities induced by an out-of-wedlock birth plus the shame, net of peer-
group e¤ects, associated with this event, multiplied by the probability of pregnancy. Hence,
a threshold rule of the form l = L (s; e;y0) obtains such that for l > L (s; e;y0) the female
agent will seek sex, and will not otherwise. This threshold will be is a function of the state
of contraceptive technology, , as can be seen from (3). As the failure rate of contraception,
1   , declines the threshold value for libido, l, will drop, assuming P (e), and A0 (y0; I 0)
remain constant.
The odds of a type-y0 female youth, with a socialization level of s, engaging in premarital
sex are given by
 (s; e; y0)  1  L (L (s; e;y0)) ; (4)
while the probability of becoming pregnant is23
(1  ) (s; e; y0) :
6. Adulthood
At the start of adulthood, females and males match for the rest of their lives. A female
will enter a marriage with productivity level, y, and possibly some out-of-wedlock children,
represented by I. Now, a type-(y; I) female will be matched with a male of productivity,ey, according to some marriage rule, discussed later. A young married couple realize utility
from their match denoted by U(y; ey; I). Presume that felicity of a match is increasing in the
productivity of female, y, and male, ey. Higher types will earn more. It also seems reasonable
to assume that U(y; ey; 0) > U(y; ey; 1). An out-of-wedlock birth may prevent a female from
realizing the full potential of her productivity. Perhaps she could not fulll her educational
aspirations or received less job experience due to a teenage pregnancy. The male may be less
23In modern times there are di¤erences in the choice of contraception by education and income. One could
add a pregnancy prevention e¤ort choice into the analysis to proxy for this. (Note that the set of contraceptives
has changed over time so that it would be di¢ cult to model this in a systematic way.) Then, poorer types
will be less diligent at preventing pregnancies because doing so has a smaller benet for them. For example,
suppose that the odds of safe sex are given by d, where d is the diligence expended in contraception and 
is the e¢ cacy of contraception. Let the disutility of e¤ort be given by d1+"=(1 + "). Then, the teenage girl
will pick d in line with
max
d
fdA(y0; 0) + (1  d) [A0 (y0; 1)  S (s) + P (e)]  d1+"=(1 + ")g:
It is easy to deduce that the solution for diligence, d, is given by
d = f[A0(y0; 0) A0 (y0; 1) + S (s)  P (e)]g1=":
Observe that d will rise with a girls type, provided that A0(y0; 0)   A0 (y0; 1) does. Perhaps evidence of the
e¢ cacy of contraception use by socioeconomic class could be used to pin down ".
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engaged with a daughter that is not his own. Parents also derive expected utility from their
daughter, D(y0; I 0), which is increasing in y0 with D(y0; 0) > D(y0; 1). A daughter with an
out-of-wedlock birth may earn less and marry a less-desirable husband than a daughter who
does not have one. This reduction in her socioeconomic status a¤ects the parentsutility.
Socializing their daughter involves a cost, the disutility of which is denoted by V (s). The
function V (s) is presumed to be increasing and convex in s. All of these felicity streams are
public goods enjoyed jointly by husband and wife.
Remember that for a female youth the probability of having out-of-wedlock children is
(1  )  (s; e; y0). The odds of not having an out-of-wedlock birth are 1  (1  )  (s; e; y0)
= 1    (s; e; y0) +  (s; e; y0). A teenage girl may not have an out-of-wedlock birth for
two reasons: she may stay abstinent, which happens with probability 1    (s; e; y0), or
she may engage in premarital sex but does not become pregnant, the odds of which are
 (s; e; y0). Therefore, the expected level of utility for a young adult couple in a marriage
of type (y; ey; I; y0), who arbitrarily socialize their daughter to level s, will read
M (y; ey; I; y0; s) = U(y; ey; I)  V (s) + [1  (1  )  (s; e; y0)]D(y0; 0)
+ (1  ) (s; e; y0)D(y0; 1):
The young adult couple will choose s to maximize their lifetime utility. Hence, s solves
M (y; ey; I; y0)  max
s
[M (y; ey; I; y0; s)]: P(1)
The function M(y; ey; I; y0) gives the expected value for a type-(y; I) young adult female
marrying a type-ey young adult male, who together have a type y0 daughter, and vice versa.
Then, the value function for a young adult female just prior to marriage will read
A (y; I) 
Z Z
M (y; ey; I; y0) dY m (eyjy; I) dY (y0jy); (5)
where Y m (eyjy; I) denotes the conditional odds of a type-(y; I) female drawing a type-ey male
on the marriage market. These odds are discussed next.
6.1. Matching Process
Suppose that the conditional odds of a type-(y; I) female drawing a type-ey male on the
marriage market are described by the distribution function Y m (eyjy; I). Presume that the
distribution Y m (eyjy; 0) stochastically dominates Y m (eyjy; 1). Thus, a girl with an out-of-
wedlock birth is less likely to match with a high-type male than a girl without one. The
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precise form of this conditional distribution will depend upon the assumed matching process.
It will be assumed that a fraction  of couples is matched in accordance with the Gale-Shapley
algorithm while the remaining fraction 1  is matched randomly. This algorithm computes
the utilities from various types of marriages and orders them from the highest down to the
lowest. (Remember that all utility ows within a marriage are public goods.) The presence
of an out-of-wedlock birth reduces the desirability of a match. The matching process then
allocates people into marriages starting with the highest-valued matches and going down in
the list until everybody is matched. The algorithm tends to match similar types with similar
types. Strong assortative mating is not observed in the U.S., which explains the inclusion of
randomness in the matching process. The details are in Appendix 13.1.
An out-of-wedlock birth makes it more likely that a woman will never marry. In the
modern era, a teenager with an out-of-wedlock birth had a 16% chance of never marrying by
ages 40-44, versus 9% for a teenager without an out-of-wedlock birth (based on data from
the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth). The Gale-Shapley algorithm could be modied
to allow for this. Imagine making a deduction from household utility for an out-of-wedlock
birth, say . Then, some males and females may nd it better to remain single than to accept
the best match that they can attain on the marriage market. Undertaking such an extension
would involve computing the value of single life for men and women.24 Additionally, women
who have an out-of-wedlock birth, while teenagers, tend to have more children. In particular,
they have 2.8 children on average versus 2.1 for those women who did not (for married
women, ages 40-44). Extending the framework to allow for endogenous fertility brings some
interesting questions to the foreground. Would some girls choose to have an out-of-wedlock
birth? Should they take the survival odds of the child into account when considering this,
an important factor historically? The calibration strategy adopted in Section 8 penalizes an
out-of-wedlock birth in a fairly exible way. Hopefully, it picks up some aspects of these
unmodelled cost.
6.2. Solution for Socialization
The solution to problem P(1) can now be characterized. Maximizing with respect to s yields
the rst-order condition
  (1  ) 1 (s; e; y0) [D(y0; 0) D(y0; 1)] = V1(s): (6)
24An example of such an analysis is contained in Aiyagari, Greenwood and Guner (2000).
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Figure 4: The determination of s
From the above e¢ ciency condition, it is apparent that the level of socialization for a daughter,
s, will be a function of her type, y0, so that s = S(e; y0).
The right-hand side of equation (6) is increasing in s, because V is convex. The slope of
the left-hand side of the equation will now be examined. Using (3) and (4) it is easy to see
that
  1 (s; e; y0) = L1(l) (1  )S1 (s) : (7)
This will be decreasing if both S and L are concave functions. Note that L1 (L (s; e;y0)) is
decreasing in s, a fact evident from (3). Therefore, the left-hand side of (6) declines with s.
To summarize, the situation is portrayed by Figure 4.
Intuitively, a drop in the failure rate for contraception, 1  , will cause the Lhs curve to
shift leftward, resulting in a fall for the level of socialization, s. A reduction in the failure rate
reduces the marginal benet from socialization. This follows from (6) and (7) and assumes
that A(y0; I 0) and P (e) remain xed, which inuence the functions L1 and 1 through (3). A
rise in the number of girls experiencing premarital sex, e, will move the Lhs curve rightward,
as can be deduced from (3), (6) and (7). A stronger peer-group e¤ect, P (e), increases the
marginal benet from socialization, a fact which follows from (3), (6) and (7). Socialization,
s, will increase on this account. Again, this presumes that A(y0; I 0) remains xed. Next,
assume that D (y0; 0) D (y0; 1) is increasing in a girls productivity, y0. This term enters the
lefthand side of (6), and measures how a parent views the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth for
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their type-y0 daughter. This assumption implies that parents of high-type girls will be hurt
the most by out-of-wedlock births. A higher value for y0 shifts the Lhs curve to the right
because the marginal benet from socialization will rise. High-type girls will be socialized
more. If D(y0; 0) = D(y0; 1), parents would not socialize their daughters. Last, consider the
term L1(l), which enters (6) via (7). This term tells how a change in the threshold, l, will
shift the odds of a daughter having premarital sex, as represented by L1(l) (1  )S1 (s).
When it is high, shifting the threshold through shaming will have a large e¤ect. Hence,
socialization pays o¤.
7. Steady-State Equilibrium
Suppose that the economy is in a steady state. The aggregate number of girls who are
engaging in premarital sex, e, will be implicitly determined by
e =
Z
 (S(e; y); y) dY (y): (8)
Note that the term  (S(e; y); y) gives the odds that a girl of type y, who has been socialized
to the level s = S(e; y) by her parents, will engage in premarital sex. To compute e just
integrate over all types of girls, as is done. Let F represent the joint distribution for females
over (y; I). In a steady state this distribution will be given by
F (y; 1) = (1  )
Z y
 (S(e; y); y) dY (y); (9)
with
F (y; 0) = Y (y)  F (y; 1);
where e is dened by (8). The equation for (9) gives the number of young girls with a
productivity level less than y that will experience an out-of-wedlock birth.
Denition. A steady-state equilibrium consists of a threshold libido rule for female
youths, l = L (s; e;y0), a rule for how young parents socialize their daughters, s = S(e; y0),
the matching probability for an unmarried female, Y m (ey0jy0; I 0), an aggregate level of teenage
girls experiencing premarital sex, e, and a stationary distribution for unmarried females,
F (y0; I 0), such that:
1. The threshold rule for a female youth maximizes her utility, as specied by (3).
2. The parentssocialization rule maximizes their utility in line with P(1).
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3. The matching probability is determined in line with a modied Gale-Shapley matching
process described in Appendix 13.1.
4. The number of sexually experienced teenage girls is represented by (8).
5. The stationary distribution for unmarried females is given by (9).
Recall from the historical discussion in Section 2 that pervasive premarital sex is a recent
phenomenon in Western societies. It took o¤ only with the contraception revolution that
occurred during the 20th century. Living standards rose considerably between 1600 and
1900, however; this did not have an impact on premarital sex. So the functions U and D
need to be structured so that increases in income do not a¤ect the likelihood that a teenage
girl will engage in premarital sex.
Lemma 1. (Balanced growth) Suppose that U is a homogenous of degree zero function in
y0 and ey0 and that D is a homogenous of degree zero function in y0. An increase in all ys andeys by a factor  has no e¤ect on s.
Proof. See Appendix 13.2.
8. Setting up the Simulation
The model will now be simulated to see if it can explain the rise in premarital sex and the
increase in out-of-wedlock births over the last century. Simulating the model requires choosing
functional forms and picking parameter values. The functional forms will be selected so that
the model maps into an overlapping generations model with three phases of life; viz., youth,
adulthood, and old age. They are also picked to satisfy Lemma 1. Thus, long-run trends in
income will have no impact on sexual practice.
Some parameter values for the model can be taken directly from the literature or the
U.S. data. For others, this cannot be done. The strategy adopted here will be to pick these
parameters so that the model matches some stylized facts for the modern era, or the U.S.
around the year 2000. In particular, the analysis will be disciplined by calibrating the model
to a set of three cross-sectional observations for the modern time, as well as the observed
strength of peer-group e¤ects. The fact that the model can do this is not a forgone conclusion.
Then, the model will be simulated to see if it can account for the observed rise in premarital
sex over the last one hundred years, given the calibrated parameter values and the observed
technological progress in contraception.
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8.1. The Parameterization of Functional Forms
To begin with, the functions S(s), U(y; ey; I), P (e), D(y0; I 0), and V (s) need to be parameter-
ized. Before proceeding, let by(y; I) represent the income that a type-(y; I) woman can earn
on the labor market. The idea is that a womans actual productivity, by(y; I), may di¤er from
her potential productivity, y, due to an out-of-wedlock birth, denoted by I = 1. This will be
made more precise shortly. Assume that there are N productivity levels for y.
1. Let
U (y; ey; I) = ( + 2) ln(by(y; I) + ey):
This can be thought of as the utility that a married couple will enjoy over two periods
of adult life (young and old) when they have a household income of by(y; I) + ey. Here,
 represents the discount factor. The utility ow is discounted starting from the rst
period, or teenage life. There is no need to allow for lifetime growth in incomethe
proof is similar to the one for Lemma 1 on balanced growth.
2. The functions for shame, and peer-group e¤ects are given standard isoelastic repre-
sentations. The libido distribution is Weibull. This distribution has a exible density
function, which may rise and then fall in l, or just fall in l, depending on parameter
values. The functions are:
S(s) = 
s1 
1   ; P (e) = 
e1 
1   ; L(l) = 1  exp[ (l=)
] (with ;  > 0):
3. Set
D(y0; I 0) = 2
Z
ln(by(y0; I 0) + ey0)dY m0 (ey0jy0; I 0) :
The expression gives the expected discounted utility that young parents will realize
from an adult daughter of type (y0; I 0). This utility is a function of the latters expected
standard of living when married. Young parents do not know the type of male, ey0, that
their daughter will marry, which explains the expectation.
4. Assume
V (s) =   ln(!   s):
Here ! denotes the familys endowment of non-working time. The couples leisure is
given by !   s.
5. Give the conditional distribution for productivity, Y (y0jy), the following simple repre-
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sentation:
y0i = yi; with probability + (1  ) Pr(yi),
y0i = yj (for i 6= j); with probability (1  ) Pr(yj);
where Pr(yj) represents the odds of drawing yj from the stationary distribution. With
this structure,  determines the autocorrelation across types over time within a family.
6. Last, how does an out-of-wedlock birth a¤ect a womans actual productivity? The
function mapping a females potential productivity, y, into her actual level, by(y; I), is
given by
by(y; I) = ( y, if I = 0,
y   T (y)y, if I = 1,
where
T (yi)yi =
iX
j=1
(
yj
yN
)(yj   yj 1) +  ; for i = 1; 2;    ; N;
with y0  0. The function T (yi) operates as an implicit tax on an out-of-wedlock birth.
It does so in a progressive fashion, so that an out-of-wedlock birth has a disproportion-
ately damaging e¤ect on high-type females. With this formulation, the tax function is
determined by the three parameters  , , and . Taxes start at ( y1
yN
) +  and then
rise in a progressive fashion (when  > 0 and  > 1) with income, yi (for i > 1). This
is vital for explaining the cross-sectional relationship between a girls education and the
likelihood that she will have premarital sex. In fact, note that without this function
there would be no cost of having an an out-of-wedlock birth; hence, there would be
no need for parents to socialize their daughters. This function is also important for
determining the degree of assortative mating that is observed in society (conditional on
having an out-of-wedlock birth). The model abstracts from any direct costs of raising
children. As a result, the role of public policy, e.g. the welfare system, on the incentive
to engage in premarital sex is left outside of the analysis. One could think of the pro-
gressivity in the above tax schedule as capturing some of these considerations, albeit in
an ad hoc way.
8.2. Calibration
8.2.1. Productivity
The productivity process is calibrated from the U.S. data. The analysis will focus on several
stylized facts categorized with respect to a females educational background. Hence, a map-
ping needs to be constructed between educational attainment and productivity. There will
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be three groups for educational attainment: viz., less than high school, <HS; high school and
some college, HS; college and post-college, C. The productivity distributions for females and
males is specied for each category of education. An educational group is divided into six
productivity levels corresponding to the average wage rate for those individuals lying within
the following ranges for percentiles: 0 to 10, 10 to 25, 25 to 50, 50 to 75, 75 to 90, and 90 to
100. Thus, there are in all 18 productivity levels for each sex; hence, N = 18. The ranking of
income levels does not map monotonically into education groups. For example, women in the
upper end of the high school pay scale earn more than those at the lower end of the college
one. This procedure is a variation on the one employed in Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(forth). The parameterization adopted for the stationary distribution, Y , is summarized in
Table IV, which shows the mean level of productivity for each education group. The gures
have been normalized by the mean wage rate for the entire sample. With this structure, 
determines the autocorrelation across types over time within a family. Following Knowles
(1999), set the intergenerational persistence across generations at 0:70, so that  = 0:7.
Table IV: Prod. Dist.
y ey Density for Y
<HS 0.49 0.72 0.129
HS 0.72 0.98 0.596
C 1.14 1.43 0.275
(Means, tabulated from 2000 CPS)
8.2.2. Contraception
The annual failure rate for contraception in 2000 was 28%, so that the odds of safe sex are
72%. A detailed discussion about this failure rate series is contained in Greenwood and
Guner (2010), but in a nutshell the idea is to combine information on the usage of di¤erent
contraceptives at rst premarital intercourse together with statistics on the e¤ectiveness of
each type of contraception. For example in 2000, 51.2% of girls use condoms in their rst
premarital intercourse and condoms are about 85% e¤ective (which represents the odds of
not becoming pregnant over a year with typical use). An aggregate e¤ectiveness measure is
constructed by taking a weighted sum of e¤ectiveness over all di¤erent contraception methods
(e.g., condoms, the pill, withdrawal, etc.). Not using any contraception at all is included an
as option as well. An average teenager does not engage in premarital sex all the time. On
average, females have about 3 partners by age 19.25 Furthermore, teenage relationships tend
25The source is Abma et al. (2004, Table 13, p. 26).
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to be short, about 13 months.26 Taking ages 14 to 19, inclusive, as the window for teenagers
to have premarital sex, on average teenage females are exposed about half of this time to
risk. So, for the modern era  = 1 0:28=2 = 0:86; i.e., the odds of a sexually active teenager
not becoming pregnant are taken to be 86%.
8.2.3. The Choice of Parameter Values and the Calibration Targets
There are 14 parameter values to determine, f; ; ; ; ; ; ; !; ; ;  ; ; ; g. Around 2000,
the median age at rst premarital sex was about 17.6, while the median age at rst marriage
was about 25 for females.27 Taking 0.96 as a standard value for yearly discount factor, let
 = 0:967, reecting the fact that there is about a 7 year gap between the time of rst
premarital sex and the time of rst marriage. A person is assumed to spend 40% of her/his
time endowment working so set ! = 1  1=3. The remaining parameters are picked to match
four sets of targets discussed below. Given the complex nature of the system under study,
there is not a simple one-to-one mapping between a parameter and data target. Still, some
intuition can be provided about how the parameters operate.
1. The cross-sectional relationship between a girls education and the likelihood that she
will have premarital sex. The odds of premarital sex decrease with education, as can
be seen from Figure 5. The calibrated model matches this cross-sectional feature of the
data reasonably well, as can also be seen from Figure 5. About 73% of girls with less
than a high school education engage in premarital sex in the U.S. The corresponding
gure for the model is 79%. By contrast, roughly 50% of college educated girls had such
an experience, both in the data and model. Overall about 66% of girls have premarital
sex in the U.S. The number for the model is 64%. The tax parameters  , , and 
are vital here because they determine how the girls of various types are a¤ected by an
out-of-wedlock birth, both directly through their own future productivity and via the
marriage market. The parameters of the libido distribution,  and , are obviously
important because they will govern the ow of girls into premarital sexual activity as
the cost of this activity falls.
2. The amount of time that a mother spends with her child, as a function of the mothers
educational background. Time spent increases with education, as Figure 6 illustrates.
The model is good at mimicking this cross-sectional feature of the data too, as can
26Sources: Ryan, Manlove, and Franzetta (2003) and Udry and Bearman (1998).
27The median age at rst premarital sex is taken from Finer (2007), and is for the period 1994-
2003. The median age at rst marriage for 2000 is taken from the Census Bureau web page,
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms2.pdf.
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be seen from the gure. The parameters  and  are key here. They determine how
parents cares about their daughters () and how costly is socialization ().
3. The correlation between a husbands and wifes education. This correlation is examined
separately for women with and without out-of-wedlock births. The match between the
data and model is shown in Table V. The model has little trouble reproducing the facts.
Recall that the parameter  controls the degree of assortative mating. It is important
for matching the correlation between a husbands and wifes education, especially in the
absence of an out-of-wedlock birth. The presence of an out-of-wedlock birth reduces
the degree of assortative mating. The tax parameters  , , and  impinge directly on
this target, by determining the worth of a woman, with and without an out-of-wedlock
birth, on the marriage market.
Table V: CorrelationsMatching by Educ.
Data Model
Females history
Without out-of-wedlock birth 0.49 0.51
With out-of-wedlock birth 0.29 0.28
4. The impact of peer-group e¤ects on the likelihood of engaging in premarital sex. The
last target is the semi-elasticity for the peer-group e¤ect estimated in Section 3. This
elasticity measures the strength of peer-group e¤ect in data and is used to discipline
the magnitude of the e¤ect in the model. The model hits this target almost exactlysee
Table VI. Not surprisingly, this fact helps to tie down the peer group parameters  and
.
Table VI: Peer-Group Effect
Data Model
Semi-Elasticity 0.068 0.068
The parameter values for the model are listed in Table VII. The implicit tax schedule
on an out-of-wedlock birth is shown in Figure 7. It weighs high on a young woman at the
upper end of the (potential) education scale. It is interesting to note that the likelihood a
teenage girl will feel very upsetif she gets pregnant increases with her mothers education
background, as the left panel of Figure 8 makes clear. The right panel plots for the model a
measure of the expected shame associated with premarital sex. The required expected level
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Figure 5: Cross-sectional relationship between the odds of a girl engaging in premarital sex
and her educational background, data and model
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Figure 6: Cross-sectional relationship between the time spent with a daughter (as fraction of
total hours) and the mothers educational background, data and model
29
<HS HS C
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Im
pl
ici
t t
ax
 o
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
Education Level
Figure 7: Implicit tax on an out-of-wedlock birth by education level, model
of shame is about 70% of the median joy from sex.28 This seems reasonable.
28The average expected level of shame in the model is given by (1  ) R S(S(e; y))dY (y). Normalize this
by the median level of libido for a Weibull distribution, which is given by  ln(2)1=.
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Figure 8: Left panel, Cross-sectional relationship between the daughters shame from an
out-of-wedlock birth and her mothers educational background, data; Right panel, Cross-
sectional relationship between the daughters expected shame from engaging in premarital
sex (normalized by the median level of libido) and her mothers educational background,
model
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Table VII: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comment
Tastes
 = (0:96)7 Standard
 = 2:41,  = 0:21 (consumption and leisure) Calibrated
 = 6:2,  = 0:40 (shame) Calibrated
 = 0:23,  = 0:42 (peer group) Calibrated
Productivity
yissee Table I for average values. U.S. data
 = 0:70 Knowles (1999)
! = 0:6 Standard
Matching
 = 0:80 Calibrated
Tax Schedule
 = 4; 500,  = 4:9,  = 0:04 Calibrated
Libido
 = 2:2,  = 0:5 Calibrated
Contraception
2000 = 0:86 Greenwood and Guner (2010)
9. The Computational Experiment
Imagine starting the world o¤ in a situation where premarital sex is risky. Specically,
assume in the initial situation that the annual failure rate for contraception is 72%; this is
Greenwood and Guners (2010) estimate for 1900. This implies that the odds of safe sex are
1-0.72/2=64%. Let the failure rate decline smoothly over time from 36 to 14%the number
picked earlier for 2000. The odds of safe sex rose for three reasons. First, over time, there
was a rise in the number of teenagers that use some form of contraception. The number of
teenagers using any method increased from 40% to 80% between 1900 and 2000, perhaps
due to better information o¤ered by birth control clinics, doctors, schools, etc. Second, the
e¤ectiveness of any given method tended to rise. Third, new methods, such as the pill, became
available; although, the pill had a very marginal impact on teenagers given its limited use
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Figure 9: Sexual revolution
again, see Greenwood and Guner (2010) for more information.29 The inputted time prole
for the odds of safe sex is displayed in the left panel of Figure 9. The estimated e¤ectiveness
of contraceptives increases pretty steadily between 1960 and 2000Figure 2. So, what will
happen in the economy under study?
The increase in the e¢ cacy of contraception induces a sexual revolution in the model,
which is displayed in the right panel of Figure 9. The number of women practicing premarital
sex rises from 16% to 64%. It is reasonable to postulate that the number of women engaging
in premarital sex translates directly into a measure of that generation that has a favorable
attitude toward it. At any point of time, the real world society is made up of many generations
of women, each of which had a di¤erent sexual experience. Averaging across all generations
gives a measure of societys attitude toward premarital sex. Do this for the three generations
in the model. As can be seen, attitudes lag current sexual practice.30 Additionally, as
contraception becomes more e¤ective, parents socialize their daughters lessFigure 10.
Interestingly, socialization has a humped-shaped pattern. The decline in the odds of
pregnancy, 1   , reduces the incentive to socialize, as was discussed in Section 6.2. But, it
also lowers the threshold value for premarital sex, l, which entices more girls to engage in
this activity. This can increase the density function, L1(l), which measures the impact of
29The technology of contraception is taken as exogenous here. Some innovations are no doubt driven by
demand, and hence may be a¤ected by culture as well. Condoms were known by the Egyptians and Romans
but their mass production had to wait until the early 20th century. Modelling innovations in contraception
within the current framework, however, would not be an easy task.
30See footnote 35 for an illustration of how stigma may be transmitted over time. This leads to persistence
in parentssocialization decisions.
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Figure 10: The decline in socialization and the rise in out-of-wedlock births
a shift in the threshold on the odds of a girl engaging in premarital sex. If this latter e¤ect
is large enough, it pays for parents to socialize their daughters more in order to raise this
threshold and dissuade premarital sex.
The number of out-of-wedlock births rises. In particular, in the model they rise from 7.4%
to 9.1%. This compares with an increase from 2.3%, that was observed in 1929, to 9.9%, seen
in 1990. Thus, the model has a little di¢ culty mimicking the low observed rate in 1929. The
extension developed in Section 10 helps a lot with this shortcoming. There is a \-shaped
pattern in out-of-wedlock births. Figure 2, which plots out-of-wedlock births in the U.S.,
shares this feature. Out-of-wedlock births initially rise as more people engage in premarital
sex, due to improvements in contraception. For the model, the downturn in births occurs
because, after some date, the negative impact that technological progress in contraception
has on out-of-wedlock births will begin to exceed the positive e¤ect resulting from the fact
that more people are engaging in premarital sex. To understand this, think about what would
happen if contraception became perfect: there would be no out-of-wedlock births.
9.1. The Importance of Socialization and Peer Group E¤ects: Some Counterfac-
tual Experiments
One can ask how important in the model is socialization for curtailing premarital sex. To
gauge the signicance of this, three counterfactual experiments are run. First, one could ask
what would happen if parents did not socialize their children at all (s = 0). The results of this
experiment are shown in top line in Figure 11. As can be seen, promiscuity would run rampant
in the model. Even in the old steady state 93% of girls would engage in premarital sex. A
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Figure 11: The impact of socialization on premarital sex, some counterfactual experiments
large fraction of these girls would become pregnant, given the poor state of contraception.
This compares with roughly 20% in the baseline model.31 Second, one could ask what would
happen if parents maintained their old steady-state levels of socialization (s = old) even in
face of technological improvement in contraception. As can be seen from the bottom line, a
substantial minority of girls (45%) would remain abstinent in the new steady state. These
two experiments suggest that socialization plays an important role in the model. Third, the
dot-dashed line (labeled s = new) plots the transitional dynamics for model in the situation
where parents always follow the new steady-state pattern of socialization. Here 41% of
girls would engage in premarital sex in the initial period (again compared with 20% in the
baseline model). Thus, the transitional dynamics to the new steady state are slower than in
the baseline model.
To cast further light on the importance of socialization, imagine that a teenage girl grows
up in a nation (the old country) with a primitive state of contraception ( = 0:64). Her
parents socialize her according to the environment there. Now, suppose that around 15 years
31In a similar vein, one could ask how important is assortative matching in the model. This can be gauged
by setting  = 0, so that all matches are random. In the old steady state the number of girls experiencing
premarital sex would rise from 20 to 26%, while in the new steady state they would increase from 64 to 71%.
Last, consider reducing the implicit tax for everyone on an out-of-wedlock birth by 50%. The number of
teenage girls engaged in premarital sex would jump up to 36% in the old steady state. The level in the new
steady state would be 88%.
35
<HS HS C
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Pr
em
ar
ita
l S
ex
Mother's Education
 Natives, model
 Immigrants, model
Figure 12: The cross-sectional odds of premarital sex in the immigration thought experiment
of age the girl and her family immigrate to another nation (the new country) with a more
advanced state of contraception ( = 0:86). In the new country the teenager will decide
whether or not to engage in premarital sex. She will do this so as to maximize her lifetime
utility, taking into account: (i) the odds of becoming pregnant; (ii) how a pregnancy will
a¤ect her new-country socioeconomic status; (iii) how becoming pregnant will relate to her
old-country set of values; (iv) what her new peers are doing. Figure 12 illustrates the upshot
of this thought experiment. The young teenagers odds of engaging in premarital sex decrease
as a function of her mothers education. In general a girl whose mother is educated has more
to lose from engaging in this risky activity than one whose is not. Note that an immigrant
is less likely to engage in premarital sex than a native is, at all education levels. Native
girls received less socialization about the perils of premarital sex than the immigrant did.
Their parents are more liberal about this, because the risk of becoming pregnant is much less
in the new country versus the old country. Overall, 55% of immigrant girls will engage in
premarital sex as opposed to 64% of native ones. Culture a¤ects decisions, but the economic
environment also a¤ects culture.
Even though socialization plays an important role in the current model it may be possible
to match the rise in premarital sex without including it, say by appealing to technological
progress in contraception alone. The observed shift in culture would then reect a passive
adaptation to the new technological environment. Here, by contrast, a framework is developed
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where parents play an important role in inculcating social norms into their children. The
cost/benet calculus governing this process is a¤ected by the state of societys technology.
Cross-sectional di¤erences in this cost/benet calculus help identify the parameters of the
model. Observations are used on: (i) the likelihood that a girl will engage in premarital
sex by her own educational background; (ii) the time spent socializing children by a mother
according to her educational attainment; (iii) the degree of assortative mating by the amount
of schooling with and without an out-of-wedlock birth; (iv) the strength of peer-group e¤ects
on the odds that a girl will participate in premarital sex. In the next section, the analysis will
be extended to modeling socialization by institutions such as the church or state. Deciphering
precisely how important a role socialization plays in a¤ecting a teenagers sexual behavior,
in contrast to other factors, would require a more exacting quantitative analysis where the
parameters of the model could be identied with precision. Perhaps there are other cross-
sectional observations that might help toward this end. In any event, the qualitative evidence
provided by historians specializing in demographic issues strongly suggests that socialization
played an important role tampering down premarital sex.
Last, the importance of peer-group e¤ects will be assessed. This is done by shutting
them down in the model (by setting  = 0). Additionally, the implied semi-elasticity for the
peer-group in the model is increased by 100% (which requires  = 0:475). The size of this
semi-elasticity is roughly two standard deviations above the magnitude estimated in the U.S.
data. As can be seen from Figure 13, while the prevalence of peer-group denitely increases
the equilibrium level of premarital sex, the impact is quite moderate. In the benchmark
analysis, the level of premarital sex in the nal steady state is 64% with peer-group e¤ects.
This compares with 61% without them and 66% when their strength is doubled. In the
analysis the size of peer-group e¤ects is disciplined by estimating the semi-elasticity from
the U.S. data. While statistically quite signicant, the estimated elasticity is small. So, this
limits the importance of peer-group e¤ects in the model. Still, they are present. In a similar
vein, while the presence of peer-group increases the amount of socialization done by parents,
the e¤ect is quite small.
10. The Church and State: An Extension
10.1. Historical Discussion
Illegitimacy imposes a nancial burden on state and church. Di¤erent European states orga-
nized and funded orphanages and conservatories that took care of abandoned children, mostly
illegitimate onessee McCants (1997), Saey (1997), Sherwood (1989) and Terpstra (2005)
for historical background. Churches, as long as they underwrote charity work, faced a similar
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Figure 13: The impact of peer-group e¤ects on premarital sex
burden.
To avoid these nancial costs, both churches and states have used over history extensive
instruments to reduce premarital sex and illegitimacy. Section 2 discussed how states em-
ployed criminal procedures to punish premarital sex. But other tools were available. One
particularly powerful one was the legal concept of illegitimacy. Both in Civil law and Common
law countries, a child was illegitimate if it was born to parents who were not legally married
to one another at the time of birth, even if they later married. Illegitimate children were
subject to a large number of discriminatory measures, from merely symbolic (as stating in
the childs birth certicate his or her condition as illegitimate) to reduced inheritance rights
see Beckert (2007) and Witte (2009).32 The most harsh of those was the English Common
law idea of lius nullius (child of nobody): having no right to inherit from either father or
mother, no right to the surname of either parent, and no claim on them for support or educa-
tion. Interestingly enough, these legal mandates were explicitly justied as a way to prevent
premarital sex. As the Earl of Selborne states in Clarke v. Carn Co. (1891), A.C. 412,
427, this policy was designed for the encouragement of marriage and the discouragement
of illicit intercourse.Policies directed at generating stigma rather than explicit punishment
were also widespread. For instance, in colonial Virginia, women engaged in premarital sex
were required to o¤er a public apology in front of the congregated parish dressed in a white
sheet and carrying a white wandBrown (1996). Finally, there were more informal instru-
ments in the form of some socially sanctioned activities such as supervised courtship rituals
or the spread of the charivari as a ritual prosecutionMuir (2005). A particularly interesting
32A simple way to keep the stigma of illegitimacy public existed in Spain. By tradition, children use in
daily life both the family name of the father and the mother. Women do not take the family name of their
husband when they marry. Consequently, any person that used exclusively his mothers family name was
immediately identied as illegitimate.
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strategy was the New Englands practice of bundling.A courting couple were allowed to
lie together but separated by a bundling board with, often, the womans legs bound together
by a bundling stockingFisher (1989). This institution allowed intimacy for the young couple
without sexual contact.
Illegitimacy taxed the resources of church and state. A ne, called leyrwite, was levied on
the bondwomen of medieval English manors. The name describes its purpose and is based
on two Anglo-Saxon elements: legerto lie down and witea ne. This tax on fornication
(6d versus a daily wage of 3/4d) levied by the Lord and Lady of the manor was aimed
at discouraging bastardy, which placed great nancial strain on the manorial community
see Bennett (2003). (The Church punished fornicators more ruthlessly.) A related ne
was childwite, which was levied on out-of-wedlock births. Stone (1977) relates how parish
authorities in England frequently worked to ensure that bastards were born outside of their
local jurisdictions, so that they would not have to absorb a nancial liability. Hayden (1942-
43) discusses a similar situation in eighteenth century Ireland. Churchwardens often employed
a parish nurse. This person was commonly known as a lifter. Her task was to round up
secretly abandoned foundlings and deposit them in a nearby parish. Sometimes she sedated
the baby with a narcotic, diacodium, to mu­ e any crying. One woman, Elizabeth Hayland
in the Parish of St. Johns, lifted 27 babies in a year. Seven died in her care. A baby
that she dropped o¤ in the Parish of St. Pauls was promptly returned by their lifterthe
churchwarden then told her not to deposit babies at same place too often. Her salary for
lifting was £ 3 a year. Another nurse, Joan Newenham, started out getting paid 4s 9d for every
baby she lifted. This was subsequently switched to an annual salary of £ 4 10s. Illegitimacy
placed a great strain on the churchs or states nances. They may be called upon to provide
poor relief to an unwed mother who kept her illegitimate children. They had to support
the foundling hospitals and workhouses that received the abandoned babies, and provide the
children with the necessary food, clothing, wetnursing, etc. And, then there was the cost of
foster parents, orphanages and workhouses for the lucky children who survived.
10.2. Evidence on Religiosity and Premarital Sex in the U.S., 1994
Even during modern times there is a connection between religiosity and premarital sex. Table
VIII presents the percentage of teenagers who have experienced premarital sex broken down
by their religiosity. As can be seen, only 36% of girls who reported that religion was very
important in their lives had engaged in premarital sex versus 50% who said that it was fairly
unimportant.33 Likewise, of those girls whose parents stated that religion was important only
33The numbers of girls sampled in the two not-important-at-all cells are too small to be reliable.
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40% had experienced premarital sex, versus 48% for those who said it was fairly unimportant.
A similar picture emerges when religiosity is measured by either the frequency of church
attendance or praying. The correlation between parentsreligiosity and their income is very
weak in the U.S. data (Add Health), 0.08 to be specic. Similar correlations are found for
the other measures of religiosity. This fact will be referred to later to motivate the setup used
in the extension.
Table VIII: Religiosity and the Incidence of Premarital Sex
Religiosity Girls Parents
Very important 36.1% 39.9%
Fairly important 48.6 46.6
Fairly unimportant 50.1 48.3
Not important at all 47.0 72.6
10.3. The Extension
Suppose that todays church or state o¢ cials desire to minimize the current number of out-
of-wedlock births. To do this, assume that they embark on a program to encourage parents
to socialize their children about the perils of premarital sex. Specically, let an old couple
feel opprobrium in the amount O(r) = r1 =(1  ), with 0 <  < 1, should their daughter
experience an out-of-wedlock birth, where r is the level of activity undertaken by the state or
church to generate this stigma. Given the weak correlation between religiosity and income,
it will be assumed that the church and state direct their activities toward the population at
large; i.e., they do not target particular subgroups. Suppose that the church or state faces
the cost function r+1=( + 1), with ,   1. Clearly, the church and state may pursue
other ideals, such as the well-being of society. The virtue of the specic objective adopted
here is its simplicity.
The mathematical transliteration of the churchs goal is
min
r
f
Z
(1  )(s; e; y0)dY (y0) + r+1=( + 1)g; P(2)
subject to
  (1  ) 1 (s; e; y0) [D(y0; 0) D(y0; 1) +O(r)] = V1(s), for all y0, (10)
taking as given Y m0 (ey0jy0; I 0) and r0. The constraint is the rst-order condition that parents
solve this period to determine s. Note the presence of the opprobrium that they will feel if
their daughter has an out-of-wedlock birth. The variables s and e are implicit functions of r,
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as is made clear below. For simplicity, in this formulation the church neglects the secondary
impact that its actions may have on the marriage market through the matching function
Y m0 (ey0jy0; I 0). This channel is complicated to analyze.34 So, view the extension here as an
illustrative example of how the church or state might be incorporated into the analysis.
Minimizing gives the rst-order condition
 (1  )f
Z
f1(s; e; y0)ds
dr
dY (y0) +
Z
2(s; e; y
0)
de
dr
dY (y0)g = r; (11)
where
ds
dr
=
(1  ) 1 (s; e; y0)O1(r)

(12)
+(1  ) 12 (s; e; y0) de
dr
 [D(y
0; 0) D(y0; 1) +O(r)]

;
with
(e; y0; r)    (1  ) 11(s; e; y0)[D(y0; 0) D(y0; 1) +O(r)]  V11(s) < 0;
and
de
dr
=   r

(1  ) [using (8) and P(2)]:
In its calculus the church takes into account how its action, r, will impact on parental social-
ization decisions, s, and the peer-group e¤ect, e. These are the rst and second terms on the
left-hand side of the rst-order condition (11), respectively. Furthermore, it also takes into
consideration how a change in peer-group e¤ects, e, will inuence parental actions, s, as the
second line in (12) makes clear. By pressuring parents the church can increase the amount
of socialization that they will undertake. The peer-group e¤ect enters as an externality in
daughtersand parentsdecision making. The church or state has some power to inuence
this external e¤ect, though, and factors this into its own choice. The church or state is solving
a static Ramsey-style problem, taking as given what the future church/state will do.
The experiment conducted for the baseline model is now rerun while incorporating the
Ramsey problem solved by the church. To do this, the selection for the parameters values
governing the opprobrium function is  = 5:0 and  = 0. Next, for the cost function simply
set  = 1:0 and  = 1:0, to conserve on parameters. Last, the odds of safe sex are presumed
34To understand the problem note that churchs actions today will a¤ect tomorrows type distributions
F 0(y0; I 0). This will have an impact on the matching function Y m0 (ey0jy0; I 0) described in Appendix 13.1.
Characterizing the impact of F 0 on Y m0 involves perturbing a function with respect to a function. Note that
Y m0 (ey0jy0; I 0) enters into both (s; e; y0) and D(y0; I 0).
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Figure 14: Socialization by church and parents
to increase to 95% (for illustrative purposes), which is higher than current U.S. levels. Figure
14 shows the upshot. Overtime socialization by both the church and parents declines as
premarital sex becomes safer.35 Out-of-wedlock births start o¤ at 2.3% of total births, the
same rate as is observed for the U.S. in 1920. Thus, the presence of the church and state
has signicantly battened down premarital sex in the initial steady state compared with the
benchmark model. They rise to a peak of 6.5%, compared with the 9.9% observed in the
U.S. in 1990. The decline in birth is sharper now because the failure rate for contraception
is allowed to drop below current U.S. levels. Thus, out-of-wedlock births fall to 3.5%, which
is below the rate that occurred in 2000 of 7.5%.
35Consider the following alternative extension that injects cultural dynamics into the analysis. Let r evolve
according to
r = (1  )s+ r 1;
where the average level of socialization, s, is given by
s =
Z
S(e; y0)dY (y0):
Here the opprobrium, O(r), that parents feel when their child has an out-of-wedlock birth will adjust slowly
over time to any new economic circumstances. Social attitudes will have a capital aspect to them. In this
spirit, Fernández, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) develop a model where mens preferences toward female labor-
force participation change slowly over time in response to an increase in the fraction of working mothers
in the population (promoting further participation). In their work there are no interested parties, such as
churches, states or parents, trying to inuence this evolution.
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10.4. The Shift in Church Doctrine and the Decline in Proscription
The historical record supports the idea of lower activity in modern times by the state and
churches to reduce premarital sex. Most of the legal restrictions on illegitimate children
started to be erased in the 1960s. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968), stated that the rights of a child to sue on a deceased parents behalf may not
be denied merely because a person is the illegitimate child of the deceased. The Supreme
Court understood that such limitation would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the decision established that states were not permitted
to classify in a way that constitutes invidious discrimination against a particular class.
This idea of invidious discriminationwas developed in a number of subsequent decisions
that eliminated nearly all legal consequences of illegitimacy in the U.S. (although a few
survive, mostly related to immigration status). Similar legal changes equalizing the legal
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children spread quickly in Western European countries,
including England (1969 and 1989), France (1972 and 2001), Germany (1969 and 1997), Italy
(1975), and Spain (1981). In 2005, France went as far as removing the very same concept of
illegitimacy from its civil code.
Churches, particularly mainline protestant ones, also de-emphasized the existing strict
provisions against premarital sex. In a famous example, the Episcopal Bishop of Newark, John
Shelby Strong (a best-seller author of Christian books), called in 1987 for the recognition and
blessing of non-marital relations. In Europe, the movement was even stronger. For instance,
the German Protestant Church published in 1971 a Memorandum on Questions of Sexual
Ethics that implied that couples who intended to marry could decide for themselves whether
premarital sex was acceptableHerzog (2007).
11. Conclusions
Engaging in a premarital conjugal relationship in yesteryear was a perilous activity for a young
woman. The odds of becoming pregnant were high, given the primitive state of contraception.
The economic consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth were dire for a young woman. Being
born in or out of wedlock could be the di¤erence between life or death for a child. Just like
today young adults would have weighed the cost and benet of engaging in premarital sex.
The cost would have been lower for women stuck at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale,
so they would have been more inclined to participate. To tip the scale against premarital
sex, parents socialized children to possess a set of sexual mores aimed at shaming sex. They
did this in the face of external peer-group e¤ects that may have encouraged young women
to participate in premarital sexual activity. Parents at the lower end of the social economic
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scale would have less incentive to engage in such practice.
The church and state also inveighed against premarital activity. Historically they were
the main providers of charity for unwed mothers and out-of-wedlock children, a considerable
expense. So, they had an economic incentive to stigmatize premarital sexual activity, in
addition to caring about the well-being of their ock. Unlike parents, such institutions did
have the ability to inuence peer-group e¤ects.
With the passage of time contraception became more e¢ cient and the costs of premarital
sex consequently declined. This changed the cost and benet calculation for young adults so
that they would be more likely to participate in sexual activity. It also reduced the need for
socialization by parents, or the church and state, which would also spur promiscuity. This
is an example of culture following technological progress. An interesting question is why the
cultural prohibitions on premarital sex were abandoned so quickly, while others such as the
dietary proscriptions associated with various religions were not. Perhaps sexual attraction
is such a primal urge that there lies a huge individual incentive to abandon social norms,
especially when they can be easily circumvented in private with improved contraception.
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12. Data Appendix
12.1. Data Sources
 Figure 1. The data on attitudes by women toward premarital sex are displayed in
Figure 2 in Harding and Jencks (2003) and was kindly supplied by the authors. The
numbers on the fraction of teenage girls who have experienced premarital sex by age
19 are taken from Greenwood and Guner (2010), which contains information about the
source.
 Figure 2. See Greenwood and Guner (2010) for detailed information on how the failure
rates are constructed. The data on out-of-wedlock births for teenage girls are derived
as follows. For 1960-2000 the data are taken from Greenwood and Guner (2010). For
the 1972-2000 period it sums births to unmarried teenagers, all abortions to teenagers,
and miscarriages (calculated as 20% of births plus 10% of abortions). For the 1960-
1971 period it estimates the total number pregnancies by simply assuming that the
(abortions + miscarriages)/(out-of-wedlock births) ratio took the same value as it did
in 1972. For 1920, 1930, 1940 and 1950-1960 the series from Greenwood and Guner
(2010) is extended using the same procedure. The data on out-of-wedlock births for
1940 and 1950-1960 are from Ventura, Mathews and Hamilton (2001). For 1920 and
50
1930, using Bachus (1999) estimates for 1930-1934, out-of-wedlock births are calculated
as 14.5% of total births to teenagers. Total births to teenagers are from Heuser (1976).
 Figure 3. For the period 1580-1837 the data on out-of-wedlock births for all women
are taken from Wrigley et al (1997, p. 224). For the period 1842-2005 the source is
Ermisch (2006, Figure 1). Wrigley and Schoeld (1981, p 230) provide data on the
gross reproduction rate for 1541-1871. The data for 1876-2000 came from UK National
Statistics.
 Add Health. This research uses data from Add Health, a program project designed by J.
Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris. Special acknowledgment
is due to Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design.
Persons interested in obtaining data les from Add Health should contact Add Health,
Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524, USA
(addhealth@unc.edu). Add Health is discussed further in Section 12.2.
 Figure 5. The data on premarital sex are calculated from the 2002 National Survey of
Family Growth (Division of Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics) as
the fraction of women between ages 20 and 44 who had premarital sex before age 19.
 Figure 6. The underlying time-use data are taken from Aguiar and Hurst (2007). The
gure plots the sum of educational and recreational childcare, normalized by 100 (total
non-sleeping time per week). The sample includes all women between ages 20 and 44,
who are not (early) retirees or students, had time diaries summing up to a complete
day and had at least one child under the age of 18 at home.
 Figure 8 (and the facts on attitudes cited in the Introduction). Source: National Survey
of Family Growth. The sample contains all teenagers in the survey (15-19 years old).
 Table VIII. National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) Restricted-
Use Contractual data, Wave 1, 1994-1995. The sample contains all teenagers (15-19)
who are not married and who did not experience forced sex.
12.2. National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health)
12.2.1. Sample
The statistical analysis includes all girls between the ages of 15 and 19 in Wave I who have:
(i) responded in both Wave I and Wave II, so that their transitions can be calculated; (ii)
responded consistently. There are two types of inconsistencies: (a) those who say they have
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had sex in Wave I, but report they have never had sex in Wave II; (b) those who say they have
never had sex in Wave I, report they have had sex in Wave II, but the date given for their
sexual intercourse is before Wave I. All these observations are dropped. Additionally, all girls
are dropped who: (i) have been married (a small number); (ii) have had involuntary sex; (iii)
were in schools with less than 5 respondents. For the peersof a respondent all girls between
the ages 15 and 19 who are in the same school are considered. The sample is restricted to
girls in schools where at least 5 girls responded. The sample consists of 2,354 teenage girls
who have never had sex in Wave I. Among them about 20% initiated sex between Wave I
and Wave II. Table IX shows sample statistics for the variables used in the basic regression.
Table IX: Peer Group Effects and ShameSample Statistics
Mean Stan. Dev.
Initiate Sex between Wave I and Wave II 0.187 0.390
Peer Group (students from respondents school 0.369 0.138
who initiated sex by Wave I)
Shame 0 0.903
Parental Income ($) 46,850 55,736
Grades (average of grades in math, English, 2.105 0.729
science and social sciences, with 1 being grade A and 4 being grade D)
Romantic Relations (fraction of respondents who have a romantic 0.670 0.470
relation in Wave II)
Physical Development (fraction of respondents who feel they look 0.385 0.487
older than average)
Age 16.12 0.985
Percentage White 0.599 0.490
Percentage Black 0.229 0.420
12.2.2. Factor Analysis
In the data set there are many variables on shame, religion, etc. Using all of these variables
simultaneously induces a problem of multicollinearity. In the analysis a single variable,
shame, is constructed using factor analysis from the answers to a set of 11 questions.
Factor analysis is used to identify or conrm the latent factor structure for a group of measured
variablessee Harman (1967). Latent factors are unobserved variables that can not be directly
measured, but are assumed to a¤ect observed outcomes. In the current application, the latent
factor is the shamethat a¤ects the answers that adolescent girls give to certain questions
in Add Health.
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Consider n variables with N observations (respondents) each, and suppose each of these
variables are a¤ected by m di¤erent latent factors. Then, a factor analysis model is given by
x1   1 = l11f1 + l12f2 + :::+ l1mfm + "1
x2   2 = l21f1 + l22f2 + :::+ l2mfm + "2
...
xn   n = ln1f1 + ln2f2 + :::+ lnmfm + "n;
or in matrix notation by
X = LF+ "; (13)
where X is n  N; L is n  m, F is m  N , and " is a n  N matrix. Here xik is the
i-th observed variable for respondent k, i is its mean across the N observations, fjk is the
j-th common random latent factor for respondent k and "ik is the unobserved error term for
the i-th variable for respondent k: The basic assumptions are that the unobservable random
vectors F and " are independent with E(F) = 0; Cov(F) = I; E(") = 0, Cov(") = 	, where
	 is a diagonal matrix. The lijs are called factor loadings.
Note that since
XX0 = LFF0L0 + LF"0 + "F0L0 + ""0;
the correlation matrix for the data can be written as
RXX = LRFFL
0 + LRF" +R"FL0 +R"";
where the operator R indicates a correlation matrix. Under the assumptions on F and " (i.e.,
RF" = R"F = 0 and RFF = I); this expression becomes
RXX = LL
0 +R"":
The basic idea of factor analysis is to nd the L that minimizes R"": Note that RXX does
not depend on F. Once L is found, the factor matrix F can be recovered. In particular,
consider the following linear regression of any factor j on the n observed variables:
fj = j1x1 + j2x2 + :::+ jnxn; j = 1; ::;m:
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If the  values are known, then a factor for each respondent can be calculated as
fj;i = j1x1;i + j2x2;i + :::+ jnxn;i; k = 1; ::;m; and i = 1; :::; N:
It can be shown that, Harman (1967, Chapter 16),
j = R
 1
XXL
0
j;
where L0j = [l1j; l2j;    ; lnj]0 is a n 1 vector of factor loadings.
In the current analysis the xis represent the answers to the 11 survey questions shown
in Table X. There are 3,309 observations. A single shame factor is constructed so that
L is a 11  1 vector and F is a 1  3; 309 vector. This single shame factor explains about
50% of variation in these 11 variables. Table X shows the factor loadings (the li values for
i = 1;    ; 11) for the analysis. As the relative sizes of the factor loadings show, the shame
factor has a large inuence on a respondents guilt from premarital sex and on how she thinks
her mother will feel about her engaging in the act.
Table X: Factor Loadings
How would your mother feel about...
H1PA1. your having sex at this time in your life? 0.665
H1PA2. your having sexual intercourse with someone who was special 0.663
If you had sexual intercourse...
H1MO2. your partner would lose respect for you 0.408
H1MO3. afterward, you would feel guilty 0.618
H1MO4. it would upset your mother 0.649
If you got pregnant....
H1MO9. it would be embarrassing for your family. 0.468
H1MO10. it would be embarrassing for you 0.483
H1RE3. In the past 12 months, how often did you attend religious services? 0.478
H1RE4. How important is religion to you? 0.381
H1RE6. How often do you pray? 0.366
H1RE7. In the past 12 months, how often did you attend youth 0.400
activities in churches/synagogues/etc.?
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12.2.3. Instrumental Variable Analysis
Table XI shows the results from OLS and IV estimation of a linear probability model
Pr(y = 1jx;y i) = + x+ y i;
where the average characteristics of peers, x i, are used as instruments for y i. Here the
dependent variable is whether or not the girl had sexual intercourse during Wave I. The peers
are dened as students who are in the same grade in the same school. Regressions include
school xed e¤ects. The table also reports the rst stage F -test for the joint signicance of
the instruments and Sargans overidentication test. The null hypothesis of weak instruments
(the rst stage F -test) is rejected. The instruments jointly pass the exogeneity requirement
(the Sargan test). The size of peer-group e¤ects in column II implies that a 1 percentage
point increase in the share of girls who had premarital sex in the same grade as the respondent
increases the probability of having premarital sex by 0.38 percentage points.
Table XI: Peer Group Effects and Shame, IV Estimates
I (OLS) II (IV) III (OLS) IV (IV)
Grade Average -0.077 0.381** -0.133 0.237
Shame 0.188*** 0.186***
Parental Income -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
Romantic Relation 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.288*** 0.287***
Grades 0.109*** 0.115** 0.066*** 0.072**
Physical Development 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.066*** 0.071***
Control For Race Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage F -test 303.60 279.76
(p=0.000) (p=0.000)
Sargan Overidentication Test 6.733 6.995
(p=0.241) (p=0.345)
Number of Obs. 2,718 2,718 2,345 2,345
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13. Theory Appendix
13.1. Positive Assortative Matching
Recall that the expected lifetime utility in marriage accruing from consumption and other
factors is a public good, enjoyed in equal fashion by husband and wife. Suppose that there is
perfect assortative mating based on what each party will contribute to this expected lifetime
utility, as measured by L(y; ey; I). The lifetime utility realized for a type-(yf ; ym; I) household
will be
L(y; ey; I)  Z M (y; ey; I; y0) dY (y0jy); (14)
where M (y; ey; I; y0) is dened by P(1). There will be 2n2 possible pairings for L. Let F
represent the joint distribution for females over (yj; I). Then, the number of females of type
(yj; I) will be given by #(yj; I) = F (yj; I) F (yj 1; I). Similarly, #(eyk) denotes the number
of type-eyk males.
To characterize the implied matching process simply make a list of lifetime utilities from
pairings, starting from the top and going down to the bottom. The best females will be
matched with best males. Now, suppose that there are more of these males than females.
Then, some of the males will have to match with the next best females on the list. The
matching process continues down this list in this fashion. At each stage the remaining best
males are matched with the remaining best females. If there is an excess supply of one of the
sexes, the overow of this sex must nd a match on the next line(s) of the list.
Now, suppose that the l-th position on the list is represented by a match of type (yj; eyk; I).
Some type-eyk males may have already been allocated to females that are higher on the list;
i.e., to women that have a better combination of y and I. Let Rlm(eyk) be the amount of
remaining type-eyk males that can be allocated at the l-th position on the list. Similarly, let
Rlf (yj; I) be the number of available type-(yj; I) females. The number of matches is given by
minfRlm(eyk); Rlf (yj; I)g. Thus, the odds of a match are
Pr(eykjyj; I) = minfRlm(eyk); Rlf (yj; I)g=#(yj; I):
The matching process is then summarized by
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Ranking Lifetime Utility Odds
1 L(yn; eyn; 0) Pr(eynjyn; I = 0) = 1
...
...
...
l L(yj; eyk; I) Pr(eykjyj; I) = minfRlm(eyk);Rlf (yj ;I)g#(yj ;I)
...
...
...
2n2 L(y1; ey1; 1) Pr(ey1jy1; I = 1) = 1;
(15)
where Rl+1m (eyk) = Rlm(eyk) minfRlm(eyk); Rlf (yj; I)g, with R1m(eyk) = #(eyk), and Rl+1f (yj; I) =
Rlf (yj) minfRlm(eyk); Rlf (yj; I)g, with R1f (yj; I) = #(yj; I).
It is easy to see Y m (eymjy; I) = Pr(ey  eymjy; I) =Pmj=1 Pr(ey = eyjjy; I). Now, the distribution
function Y m (eyjy; 0) will stochastically dominate the one represented by Y m (eyjy; 1), because
having an out-of-wedlock birth will not increase the chances of a female drawing a male with
an income greater than some specied level.
Any degree of assortative matching in the economy can be obtained by assuming that some
fraction  of each type mates in the above fashion while the remaining fraction, 1 , matches
randomly. With random matching Pr(eyjy; I) = #(ey), so that Y m (eymjy; I) =Pmj=1#(eyj).
The matching process follows the Gale and Shapley (1962) algorithmsee Del Boca and
Flinn (2006) for a recent marriage application. The cue for randomness in matching comes
from Fernández and Rogerson (2001). Since all consumption for the couple is a public good,
there are no opportunities for transfers between the husband and wife here. Also, there are
no complementarities between the husband and wifes types in the production of household
income. If these assumptions were relaxed, then a matching process along the lines of Becker
(1981) could be usedsee Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009) or Choo and Siow (2009) for
recent work using this approach.
13.2. Proof (Balanced Growth)
Proof. It is easy to see that both U(y0; ey0; 0)   U(y0; ey0; 1) and D(y0; 0)   D(y0; 1) are not
functions of 0. Given this, the rst result follows almost immediately from the rst-order
condition (6), as can be deduced from a guess-and-verify procedure. Suppose that s; s0; s00;   
are una¤ected by 0. Then, there is no impact on the matching probabilities, Y m(ey0jy0; I 0)s,
because a shift in 0 does not change the ranking or mass of each type of female. The
di¤erence in expected lifetime utilities, A0(y0; 0) A0(y0; 1), is not a¤ected by 0. This implies
that  1 (s; e; y0) will remain constant from (3) and (7). Condition (6) will still hold.
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